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EQUITABLE RELIEF, COLLATERAL ATTACK
AND THE ILLINOIS TAX DEED
GUERINO J. TURANO*
Tax deeds issued pursuant to this Section are incontestable except
by appeal from the order of the court directing the County Clerk
to issue the tax deed.'
With this language, the General Assembly has favored the Illinois
tax title holder with defenses which are virtually immune to attack.
Once a final order for tax deed has been entered, the deed issued and
recorded and title conveyed to a bona fide purchaser, neither the for-
midable forces of equity nor all the powers of the press with the weight
of public opinion have been able to prevail against them.
Many lawyers are unaware of the full impact of the issuance, re-
cordation and transfer into the hands of a bona fide purchaser of tax
titles issued since the addition of the foregoing language to the Reve-
nue Act in 1951. Prior to that time an Illinois tax deed was so shaky
and uncertain a title as to be, in most cases little more than a cloud
on title.2
Because tax titles had been of such little urgency in the past, prop-
erty owners and their legal representatives had acquired the habit of
paying scant attention to the tax delinquencies and consequent tax
deeds until such time as it became advantageous to convey or mortgage
the property at which time the outstanding tax titles could either be
paid off and reconveyed, s or fought off and voided.4
The 1930s and 1940s witnessed an alarming increase in the rate
of tax delinquency, due to the depression and to the laxity of the en-
* J.D., De Paul College of Law; member of the Illinois Bar; Tax Counsel of
Chicago Title Insurance Company, Illinois Division; Chairman of State and Municipal
Taxation Committee of the Chicago Bar Association, 1969-70; specially appointed public
member of the Tax Sale Reform Sub-Committee of the Municipal Corporations Com-
mittee of the Illinois State Senate in 1969.
1. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 120, § 747 (1973).
2. See Gage v. Parker, 178 Ill. 455, 53 N.E. 317 (1889); Simpson v. Adkins, 386
111. 64, 53 N.E.2d 979 (1944); Gage v. Bani, 141 U.S. 344 (1891); Gage v. Kaufman,
133 U.S. 471. (1890).
3. See ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 120, §§ 736, 737, 738 (1973).
4. See Jackson v. Glos, 243 Ill. 280, 90 N.E. 717 (1909); Warshawsky v. Glos,
251 Ill. 377, 96 N.E. 248 (1911).
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forcement provisions of the revenue laws. The legislature reacted in
the early 1950s with new provisions requiring tax deeds to be issued
only pursuant to order of court, after hearing, and making such tax
deeds immune from collateral attack and directing the courts to con-
strue the new provisions liberally so that tax deeds would convey mer-
chantable title.'
The new teeth in the revenue laws steadily chewed away the de-
linquency rate to the extent that the current rate of delinquency is neg-
ligible, even in Cook County. 6  This new efficiency was not achieved
without causing some hardships and apparent inequities.
TAx COLLECTION AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
With the exception of a recently enacted, peculiar collection pro-
cedure currently applicable only to Cook County,7 taxes on real prop-
erty are payable annually in two equal installments,8 the first of which
becomes delinquent in May or June (unless the bills are mailed late)
and the second installment become delinquent after September 1 each
year.9 After the September delinquency date, a delinquent list is pre-
pared and published by the county collector together with a notice that
he intends to apply to the circuit court for a judgment in the amount
of the delinquent taxes plus accumulated interest and costs, requesting
an order of court directing him to sell the tax delinquent property in
satisfaction of the judgment unless the taxes are paid prior to such sale.
This publication of notice is the process which gives the court jurisdic-
tion to enter judgment against the property for the tax delinquency.
Since no in personam jurisdiction is sought, no summons or other form
of process is required.'0 A hearing is subsequently held on the col-
lector's application for judgment at which time the court hears taxpay-
ers' objections to the entry of judgment and order of sale and it is in
these proceedings that disposition is made of all assessor's objections,
5. See ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 120, §§ 744, 747 (1973).
6. Tax delinquency in Cook County is well under 1% currently.
7. The 1973 general taxes in Cook County are payable in two unequal install-
ments, a first estimated installment based on 50% of the taxes for prior year and due
on March 1, 1974, and a final installment based on the total 1973 tax less the amount
already billed on the estimated first installment. The final installment is due August 1,
1974. See P.A. 78-864, approved September 15, 1973.
8. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 120, § 675 (1973).
9. For details as to delinquency dates in various classes of counties, see ILL. REv.
STAT., ch. 120, § 705 (1973).
10. See People v. Anderson, 411 Ill. 252, 103 N.E.2d 629 (1952) and cases therein
cited.
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taxpayers' objections and tax protests." The court enters judgment
as to all taxes which remain delinquent and fixes a date for the com-
mencement of the sale. The sale is conducted by the county collector
and county clerk jointly and includes all parcels on which the taxes
remain unpaid as of the date on which the parcel is offered for sale.
In some counties, the entire sale is held on one day, while in a county
like Cook, it may extend over a period of two months. 2 Although
it is not jurisdictional, the statute' 3 requires the collector to send a no-
tice to the party in whose name the taxes were assessed, by registered
or certified mail, at least 15 days before the date of application for
judgment, notifying him of the date of application for judgment and
commencement of the sale and furnishing a description of the property.
The sale itself is a curious type of auction. The property is not
struck off to the highest bidder but rather, the successful bidder simply
pays the amount of the tax delinquency with interest and penalty due
as of the date of sale. If there is any competitive bidding between
tax buyers, the successful bidder is the one who accepts the smallest
rate of penalty per six-month period on the amount of sale in the event
that the owner or some interested party chooses to make a redemption
during the redemption period. The maximum penalty bid is twelve
percent per six months or part thereof and the minimum is zero.14  In
counties other than Cook, the amount of the judgment includes all tax
delinquencies so that the successful bidder is issued a certificate of sale.
In Cook County, only the current delinquency is included in the judg-
ment so that the successful bidder must then search the tax records
and pay up and include in his sale such other taxes as may have been
delinquent on the property as of the date of his successful bid.' 5 If
the annual tax sale fails by reason of the unwillingness of persons to
bid on the property, it is forfeited to the State of Illinois. Forfeitures
are subject to separate penalty provisions, enforcement procedures and
"over-the-counter" sales. 16
11. ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 120, § 716 (1973).
12. The Annual Tax Sale in Cook County in 1973 included 9,927 parcels. The
sale began on December 10, 1973 and ended on February 4, 1974.
13. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 120, § 711 (1973).
14. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 120, § 734 (1973).
15. These procedures are fully explained in ILL. RaV. STAT., ch. 120, § 728 (1973),
as is the successful bidder's failure to comply with these requirements.
16. The county clerk may issue a Certificate of Sale of Forfeited Property "over-
the-counter" at any time, so long as he sends a notice by registered or certified mail
to the party in whose name the taxes were last assessed, notifying him that, unless the
forfeited taxes are redeemed within 30 days, the property will be sold to satisfy said for-
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The period of redemption from tax sales is two years from the
date of sale, which period can be extended by the certificate holder
up to a total of three years so long as he extends during an existing
redemption period. 17  During the first nineteen months of the re-
demption period, the certificate holder is not required to take any posi-
tive action. However, many certificate holders engage in the practice
of sending informal notices of sale to interested parties by mail in order
to induce redemption before they incur the expenses of petitions in
court, publication, attorney's fees and attempted personal service of the
required statutory notices.18 The overwhelming majority of tax sales
are redeemed during the period of redemption,' 9 but each year, some
small percentage of delinquent property owners fail to redeem, thus
setting the stage for tax deed proceedings.
Within the last five months of the redemption period the certifi-
cate holder files a petition for tax deed in the circuit court after which,
he proceeds to attempt compliance with the diligence and notice serv-
ing requirements of Sections 263 and 266 of the Revenue Act.20 The
prescribed notices must be personally served on occupants, owners and
parties interested in the property if they can, upon due diligence, be
located in the county where the property is located. Those who cannot
be so located are to be served by registered or certified mail, return
receipt requested, at their last known address, if any, and also served
by publication along with the "unknown owners and parties interested"
in the property. The publication must be made three times in a news-
paper of general circulation in the county where the property is located
and must be made not more than five nor less than three months prior
to the date when the period of redemption expires. The notices per-
sonally served and those served by registered or certified mail must be
effected during that same time period. During the same time period,
the petitioner must also deliver to the clerk of the circuit court a list
of the names and addresses of the owners and the occupants of the prop-
feited taxes. For a detailed explanation, see ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 120, §§ 697, 727, 734,
753 and 756 (1973).
17. See ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 120, § 744 (1973).
18. Where tax sales are redeemed, the certificate holder is not reimbursed for at-
torney's fees, the cost of investigation to locate interested parties or the cost of person-
ally serving such parties. These costs are incurred between 3 and 5 months prior to
the expiration of the redemption period. Hence, if an owner intends to redeem from
the sale, the tax purchaser would prefer he do so before the notice serving period com-
mences.
19. Of the almost 10,000 parcels sold annually in Cook County, less than 500
ripen into tax deeds.
20. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 120, §§ 744, 747 (1973).
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erty and sufficient copies of similar notices which are to be sent to such
owners and occupants by the clerk of the court by registered or certi-
fied mail, return receipt requested.
After the period of redemption expires, the certificate holder files
application for a tax deed in the same proceeding where the petition
was filed. The county clerk certifies on the application that the prop-
erty has not been redeemed and the petitioner alleges that he has com-
plied with all of the requirements of the law and is entitled to a tax
deed.
The matter is set for hearing at which time the petitioner is re-
quired to prove four essential facts: (1) that all taxes and special as-
sessments which became due and payable since his purchase have been
paid; (2) that all forfeitures and sales which occurred after his pur-
chase have been redeemed; (3) that the notices required by law have
all been given; and (4) that he has complied with all other require-
ments of the law and is thus entitled to a tax deed. The court is re-
quired to "insist on strict compliance with the requirements of Section
263" of the Revenue Act and must be furnished a report of proceed-
ings of the evidence received on the application for deed. This report
must be filed and made a part of the court record.
After filing the report of proceedings, the court may enter an or-
der directing the county clerk to execute the tax deed. The deed is
then issued and recorded but the court retains jurisdiction of the matter
for purposes of issuing such other writs as may be necessary to put the
new titleholder into peaceful possession of his newly acquired prop-
erty. This becomes important as to tax deeds issued on improved
property which may be in possession of the former owner or his ten-
ants. In such cases, the court may issue a writ of assistance directing
the sheriff to put the tax deed grantee into possession.
DEFENSES IN THE TAx DEED PROCEEDING
The defenses which can be made to prevent the entry of an order
for the issuance of a tax deed, or to have an order for tax deed vacated
within the thirty-day motion period after the entry of such order are
abundant and relatively simple. Prior to the expiration of the motion
period, the court can hear defenses relating to jurisdictional defects
occurring in connection with the original judgment and order of sale
as well as defenses relating to the failure of the certificate holder to
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comply with any of the requirements of Section 263 of the Revenue
Act.21
In raising any defenses to the entry of an order for the issuance
of a tax deed, it would be well for the attorney to remember that he
will not be afforded a hearing until after the period of redemption has
expired so that, in the event that his defense is not successful, he will
be unable to effect a redemption to preserve his client's property. The
1970 tax reform legislation includes a remedy for this problem. An
amendment to 253 of the Revenue Act 2z now permits an interested
party to make a "redemption under protest" with the county clerk,
which redemption will only become operative if the redeemer makes
no defense to the entry of the order for tax deed or if his defense to
the entry of such order is unsuccessful. In either event, the redemp-
tion will then take effect and the property will not be lost.
Jurisdictional defects occurring in connection with the original
judgment and order of sale have been raised in some cases. In Nix
v. Smith23 the following jurisdictional defects were raised:
(a) In the published notice (the process upon which the tax sale
judgment was entered), the description of the property was
fatally defective;
(b) There was no precept24 as required by Section 239 of the
Revenue Act;25
(c) The judgment and order of sale was not entered in -the col-
lector's tax judgment, sale, redemption and forfeiture record
as required by Section 232 of the Revenue Act. 26
In that proceeding the foregoing defects were raised via a sep-
arate collateral suit to quiet title, the plaintiff alleging his right to do
so was based on his inability to raise those defects as defenses in the
proceeding for tax deed. The court held that such objections could
and should have been raised as defenses to the entry of an order for
issuance of a tax deed and therefore, the collateral quiet title suit did
not lie.
A wealth of defenses can be found in the many highly technical
demands made of the tax certificate holder in Section 263 of the Reve-
nue Act. As stated above, Section 266 directs the court to insist on
21. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 120, § 744 (1973).
22. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 120, § 734 (1973).
23. 32 Ill. 2d 465, 207 N.E.2d 460 (1965).
24. The precept is a legal process whereby the court authorizes the county collector
to sell the property in satisfaction of the tax judgment.
25. ILL. RE . STAT., ch. 120, § 720 (1973).
26. ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 120, § 713 (1973).
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strict compliance with the requirements of Section 263. The bulk of
the defenses to be found in non-compliance with the requirements of
Section 263 will naturally relate to the question of diligence, the con-
tent of the notice, the time of service, the mode of service and who
is or is not a "party interested." However, a lawyer seeking to prevent
the entry of an order for issuance of a tax deed or to have such an
order vacated on motion, for non-compliance with the requirements of
Section 263, is limited only by his own imagination and his ability to
ferret out even the most technical of flaws in his opponent's prepara-
tions.
After the entry of an order for tax deed and the expiration of the
thirty-day motion period thereafter, none of the foregoing avenues of
defense are available to a party seeking to have the order for tax deed
vacated.
There are only two methods by which a final order for issuance
of a tax deed can be attacked. The first is by direct appeal from the
court order itself. The second is to be found in the following language
of Section 266 of the Revenue Act:
[H]owever, relief from such order may be had under Section 72
of the Civil Practice Act,27 approved June 23, 1933, as heretofore
and hereafter amended, in the same manner, upon the same
grounds and to the same extent as may be had under that Section
with regard to final orders, judgments and decrees in other pro-
ceedings.
The single most important decision in this area is Urban v. Lois,
Inc.28 in which the court gave the following clear and concise statement
of the law:
We turn first to the basic question of jurisdiction and the office of
Section 72. We think it clear that the entire tax sale proceeding
is one in rem rather than in personam . . . . It is the jurisdiction
over the land itself, acquired in the original application for judg-
ment and order of sale that gives the county court the power to act.
• ..Once acquired the county court retains jurisdiction to make
all necessary findings and enter all necessary orders supplemental
to the original tax sale . . . . Such order could thereafter be at-
tacked only by direct appeal or by appropriate proceedings under
Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act.29
The court further explained what it meant by an "appropriate pro-
ceeding under Section 72" when it said:
27. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110, § 72 (1973).
28. 29 I1. 2d 542, 194 N.E.2d 294 (1963).
29. Id. at 546, 194 N.E.2d at 296.
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It has been well established in tax deed proceedings that Section
72 cannot be used to relitigate any issue already passed on by the
trial court, in the absence of fraud.30
In subsequent cases the court was confronted with the more so-
phisticated question of what constitutes sufficient fraud to give the
court the power to reopen an order for tax deed. The court settled
the question once and for all in the case of Dahlke v. Hawthorne, Lane
and Co."' with the following pronouncement:
We have repeatedly held that in a tax deed proceeding Section 72
of the Civil Practice Act may not, in the absence of fraud, be used
to again put in issue questions previously passed upon by the trial
court; such prior determination being conclusive on all parties and
immune from collateral attack . . . . Fraud implies a wrongful
intent-an act calculated to deceive.8 2
With the Dahlke decision, the evolutionary process seems to have
been completed. It establishes that a tax deed proceeding cannot be
collaterally attacked and that any attempt to vacate or set aside a final
order for the issuance of a tax deed must be either by a direct appeal
or by proceedings under Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act. This
latter alternative must, however, establish proof of wrongful intent or
a pattern of deception 3 in order that one may successfully attack the
tax deed.
Upon a showing, to the satisfaction of the court, that there has
been sufficient fraud to set aside the order for issuance of the tax deed,
there remains yet another hurdle. Subsection 5 of Section 72 of the
Civil Practice Act reads as follows:
Unless lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appears from the record
proper, the vacation or modification of an order, judgment or de-
cree pursuant to the provisions of this section does not affect the
right, title or interest in or to any real or personal property of any
person, not a party to the original action, acquired for value after
the entry of the order, judgment or decree but before the filing of
the petition, nor affect any right of any person not a party to the
original action under any certificate of sale issued before the filing
of the petition, pursuant to a sale based on the order, judgment or
decree.
Thus, if a bona fide purchaser has intervened by acquiring the
property prior to the filing of the petition under Section 72, the court
is unable to vacate the order for tax deed. The property is forever
30. Id. at 548, 194 N.E.2d at 297.
31. 36 Ill. 2d 241, 222 N.E.2d 465 (1967).
32. Id. at 244, 222 N.E.2d at 466.
33. See Zeve v. Levy, 37 IM. 2d 404, 226 N.E.2d 620 (1968).
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lost, but relief under Section 72 is yet available. In the case of Peo-
ple ex rel. Wright v. Doe 4 the court said:
Thus, even if there were a conclusive adjudication that the property
is held by a bona fide purchaser, that would afford no ground for
dismissing the petition. If the petitioner were found entitled to re-
lief against Interstate Bond Company, it should be possible for the
court to frame its order in such a manner as to afford relief against
the original holder of the tax deed, while protecting the rights of a
bona fide purchaser.35
In the Wright case, the plaintiff had sought to collaterally attack
a tax deed by petition under Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act after
the property had been conveyed to an alleged bona fide purchaser.
When the defense was made that the Section 72 petition was barred
by the intervention of the bona fide purchaser, the trial court dis-
missed the petition. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed giving
the foregoing reasons. Since this remedy is available, the same reason-
ing would seem to operate as a bar to a separate collateral attack in
equity where fraud is involved. Normally, equity takes jurisdiction of
matters where fraud is involved but where, as here, there is an ade-
quate remedy at law (under Section 72) a separate bill in equity will
not lie.
Many lawyers are troubled by the fact that very valuable pieces
of property can be lost to tax buyers for a very small fraction of their
value. It is possible to acquire a tax deed for only one year's tax de-
linquency, indeed, for one installment of a special assessment warrant.
In some cases the value of the property lost may be several hundred
times the amount necessary to redeem from the tax sale. The reasons
why owners, mortagees and other interested parties fail to redeem from
such tax sales vary widely. Some are tragic, being due to severe physi-
cal or mental disability for extended periods. In other cases the land-
owner may well have taken the advice of "barber shop" lawyers.
In recognition of the fact that it is sometimes the case that prop-
erty is lost for taxes without fault on the part of the owner, the 1970
legislature included in its tax reform package a completely novel pro-
vision, embodied in Section 247a of the Revenue Act,36 which provides
an indemnity fund for reimbursement of any owner who sustains loss
or damage by reason of the issuance of a tax deed pursuant to Sections
34. 26 Ill. 2d 446, 187 N.E.2d 222 (1963).
35. Id. at 454, 187 N.E.2d at 226.
36. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 120, § 728a (1973).
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266 or 266a3 7 "without fault or negligence of his own." Lawyers who
represent clients who have lost their property might well look into the
possibility of recovery from this indemnity fund if a Section 72 petition
will not lie. On occasion lawyers, whose sense of justice will not ac-
cept the fact that equity must stand by and permit an owner to lose
his property for a tax delinquency which is but .a small fraction of the
value, will attempt to induce equity to take jurisdiction in a collateral
proceeding on an unjust enrichment theory. These cases usually take
the form of a bill to quiet title or to impress a constructive trust on
the tax title. In the case of Stanley v. The Bank of Marion,", where
the property sold involved the home of the taxpayers, the sale included
only one year's tax delinquency and the taxpayers had themselves paid
all taxes which became due and payable subsequent to the sale, the
court said:
It is, of course, unfortunate that appellees have suffered the loss of
their property because of one year delinquent taxes. It is clear,
however, they were fully informed of the sale and were afforded
every opportunity to redeem or defend. Having failed to do so,
they are in no position to collaterally attack the original tax pro-
ceedings. 39
Although that decision took the form of a Section 72 petition
rather than a separate suit in equity, it is illustrative of the attitude of
the court toward unjust enrichment defenses to tax deed petitions.
On more than one occasion lawyers have turned to the federal
courts for relief after having exhausted all statutory and constitutional
sources in Illinois. Two of these federal attacks found their way to
the United States Supreme Court. The first of these was Balthazar v.
Mari, Ltd.,40 a case originally heard by a three-judge panel in the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
The plaintiffs in that case claimed that when their property was
sold at a tax sale, they were deprived of due process of law as guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment. They asserted that tax delin-
quent real property cannot be sold by the state to a private purchaser
at a tax sale unless there is provision for unrestricted public bidding
based on the value of the property. Relying on federal condemnation
cases, they also maintained 'that they were deprived of "just compensa-
tion" for their property.
37. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 120, §§ 747, 747a (1973).
38. 23 Iil. 2d 414, 178 N.E.2d 367 (1962).
39. Id. at 420, 178 N.E.2d at 370.
40. 301 F. Supp. 103 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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The district court summarily waved away the "just compensation"
theory simply by stating that the condemnation cases were inapplicable;
that, rather than taking private property for a public purpose, Illinois
is collecting taxes which were admittedly overdue. The court ex-
plained at length the Illinois tax collection and enforcement processes
and compared them to some other systems. They recognized that the
two-year redemption period gave owners who did not intend to redeem
from tax sales ample opportunity to sell the property during that two-
year period and thus recover the surplus value of their land. They
found delinquent landowners in Illinois to have been given adequate
notices and concluded that the Illinois legislation was constitutional.
An appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court4 which af-
firmed without handing down an opinion.
Thereafter, in the case of Catoor v. Blair,42 the same issues were
raised in a class action, also heard by a three-judge panel in the North-
ern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The court there held that no-
tices and an opportunity for a landowner to either pay or object to his
real estate taxes, as provided for in the Illinois tax deed statute, are
constitutionally adequate when weighed against the legitimate interest
of the State in collecting its taxes, and owners are -not deprived of their
Fourteenth Amendment rights of due process and equal protection.
Again an appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court4" and
they affirmed, handing down no written opinion.
CONCLUSION
Tax deed proceedings are of a highly technical nature and the
courts are required to hold tax deed petitioners to strict compliance
with the statutory prerequisites to the issuance of an order for tax deed.
Thus, lawyers who would defend against entry of an order for issuance
of a tax deed or would move to vacate such an order within the motion
period after its entry have a wide variety of possible technical defects
from which they can construct defenses. However, when no action
has been taken until after an order for issuance of a tax deed has be-
come final, defenses are limited to either a direct appeal or a petition
under Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act, the latter being available
only if the essential elements of fraud can be alleged and proved. This
involves clear proof of an intent to defraud or demonstration of a clear
41. 396 U.S. 114 (1969).
42. 358 F. Supp. 815 (N.D. Il1. 1973).
43. 414 U.S. 990 (1973).
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pattern of deception. It should also be remembered that, if the prop-
erty is in the hands of a bona fide purchaser prior to the filing of the
Section 72 petition, relief is limited to monetary damages against the
party who committed the fraud.
Furthermore, lawyers who would spend their clients' resources at-
tempting to persuade the courts to afford additional remedies are well
advised to note the following language of the Balthazar opinion:
Unfortunately, the Illinois system severely penalizes all real estate
owners who fail to redeem. The total forfeiture seems extremely
harsh when overdue taxes amount to only two or three percent of
the property's value. But oppressive statutes must be tempered by
the legislature, not the courts.44
44. 301 F. Supp. at 106 (emphasis added).
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